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Resumen  
Teniendo en cuenta que la característica inherente de 
confidencialidad y las demandas de transparencia coexisten en 
el contexto del arbitraje de inversión internacional, este trabajo 
se centra en un enfoque hacia una conciliación de estas dos 
categorías. Desde la perspectiva del principio de transparencia 
en el ámbito del derecho económico internacional, y teniendo en 
cuenta la naturaleza del arbitraje internacional —especialmente 
del arbitraje internacional de inversiones—, se descubrió un 
argumento defendible con el fin de pasar por alto la necesidad 
de confidencialidad y satisfacer la demanda de transparencia en 
el procedimiento de arbitraje de inversión sin afectar su 
eficiencia. 
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Abstract 
Given that the inherent feature of confidentiality and the 
demands for transparency coexist in the context of international 
investment arbitration, this paper focuses on an approach that 
makes a compromise between these two categories. From the 
perspective of the principle of transparency in the field of 
international economic law, and taking into account the nature 
of international arbitration, especially international investment 
arbitration, a defendable argument can be made to overlook the 
need for confidentiality and satisfy the demands for 
transparency in the investment arbitration procedure, without 
impairing its efficiency. 
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1. Introduction 
 
n the context of the current state of affairs corresponding to 
international investment law, the question of how to balance the 
concepts of confidentiality and transparency in investment arbitration is 
very common. In fact, both confidentiality and transparency 
conceptually conflict with each other to the point that it is safe to argue 
that there is currently an obvious tension between them. On the one 
hand, the demands for transparency of the international investment 
arbitration procedure are founded on the public interests (Mankiw, 
2004: 248-251) that are ventilated in virtually every single case. This is 
because one of the parties is actually a state. Those who stress this 
argument state that investment arbitration is, in fact, a special kind of 
arbitration that, because of this condition, deserves a closer look (Knahr 
and Reinisch, 2006). On the other hand, there are also considerations to 
be made from the perspective of the nature of international arbitration, 
of which investment arbitration is a sub-category. As will be examined, 
an essential feature of this institution lies precisely in the fact that 
certain aspects of the procedure are to be kept confidential if the parties 
previously agreed to do so. International investment arbitration is still 
international arbitration. Accordingly, there is an element of voluntary 
agreement in investment arbitration that somehow made this institution 
attractive for potential users. A compromise is to be made between these 
two important categories that safeguards international investment 
arbitration as an efficient means of dispute settlement. 
 
The application of the principle of transparency in the context of 
international economic law requires a nuanced approach when it comes 
to international investment arbitration, because the essential 
characteristics of this institution—its nature, that which makes it what it 
is and distinguish it from other institutions—so advise it. By 
overlooking the very nature of international investment arbitration, not 
forgetting the important role it plays in the system of international 
investment law, any policy towards making it more ―transparent‖ would 
necessarily impair its functioning and the subjects of international 
investment law would lose a worthy and efficient means of dispute 
resolution. 
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In order to address this particular question, this paper will briefly 
examine the concept of transparency, initially from a broad perspective. 
By doing so, it should become clear that, in the specific context of 
international economic law, transparency is elevated to the category of a 
principle. Later, it should also become clear that the application of such 
a principle demands a special nuance when it comes to the procedure 
that takes place in international investment arbitration. 
 
Even though the reference to the conceptualization of the transparency 
principle is of a crucial importance, the nature of international 
arbitration, with special reference to investment arbitration, will be 
examined first. By doing this, the essential features of this particular 
institution will be determined in order to differentiate it from other 
institutions of law. By grasping the inherent features of investment 
arbitration, the reasons for choosing this particular dispute settlement 
mechanism will be uncovered. In other words, the fundamental reason 
for the efficiency of this means of dispute adjudication would be known 
(Rothbard, 2002: 1036). 
 
Only by doing this, keeping in sight the elements of the principle of 
transparency and its special application within the field on international 
investment arbitration, the implications of any policy directed to affect 
this procedure could be fully measured. 
 
Finally, both confidentiality and transparency will be weighted in the 
context of international investment arbitration, with the specific goal of 
finding a defendable compromise that respects both the need for 
confidentiality and the demands for transparency in international 
investment arbitration. International investment arbitration is essentially 
confidential (Hwang S.C. and Chung, 2009: 612). In this sense, a valid 
argument needs to be made in order to justifiably overlook this essential 
feature. 
 
2. International Investment Law and International Arbitration 
 
The main reason for this section of this article is to fully understand the 
institution that is being examined: international investment arbitration. 
Only then will its inherent characteristics become clear. By grasping the 
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essential elements of the concept, the implications of any given policy 
directed to affect it can be sufficiently understood. Furthermore, more 
specifically, only by understanding the nature of international 
arbitration, taking into account the role it plays in the field of 
international investment law, can the application of a policy proposing a 
particular perspective of the principle of transparency be apprehended. 
 
Foreign direct investment, regulated most commonly by investment 
agreements negotiated between state officials,1 is a sensitive topic. On 
the one side, there is the state, interested in promoting investment from 
abroad, for this is a well-known source of economic growth, which 
would ultimately help it to maintain its popular support. On the other 
side, there is the investor, commonly a private person2 (Sornarajah, 
2007: 65-71), be it natural or juridical, which seeks to increase its own 
wealth by assigning resources in profitable channels of production on 
the territory of the host state. Naturally, both parties want to protect 
their interests in the most efficient way possible. This is of special 
relevance when a breach of the legal order is perpetrated by one of them 
and the original order needs to be restored, usually by deciding upon 
damage reparation. 
 
Under international investment law, there have been traditional means 
of investment dispute settlement, such as domestic courts and 
international arbitration. 
 
To resort to the national courts as an option for justice adjudication is 
rather limited as a means of dispute settlement. It usually takes place in 
absence of an agreement to settle the dispute before an arbitration 
tribunal or any other mechanism (Reinisch and Malintoppi, 2008: 694). 
Thus, a dispute between a host state and an investor would have to be 
settled by a court of the host state (Dolzer and Schreuer, 2008: 214). 
There are two problems with this option. First, whether rightly or 
wrongly, the investor would always tend to fear a lack of impartiality of 
                                                 
1 According to Griebel (2008: 6), protection for foreign investment can take two basic 
shapes (Grundkonstellationen): investment without any extraordinary legal protection, 
and investment protected under an investment contract between a particular investor 
and its host state. 
2 Sornarajah (2007: 65-71) affirms that state entities may also act as investors.  
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the host state‘s judge, for it is not uncommon that indirect interventions 
of the executive would occur—despite the presumption of the 
independence of the judiciary—and the eventual sense of loyalty from 
the judge of the host state would influence the outcome of the 
proceedings. In addition, given the highly technical questions that arise 
from matters of international investment law, the investor may fear that 
the national judge would lack the expertise needed to deal with such 
cases (Dolzer and Schreuer, 2008: 214). Obviously, both parties would 
prefer a forum that would provide the minimum standard of impartiality 
in order to count on a safe investment scenario.3 
 
Given the limitations of the above-mentioned mechanism, a large 
majority of international investment agreement models include an 
international arbitration clause in its provisions.4 By doing so, granting 
access to investors to present claims before an international arbitration 
tribunal comes with advantages for both parties. According to Dolzer 
and Schreuer (2008: 221), the investor gains access to a known and 
effective international means of restitution, which is known for being 
less costly and more efficient than litigation. Furthermore, it grants high 
security of counting on highly skilled decision-making (Benson, 1999: 
94), which is a very sensitive and important aspect. The advantages for 
the host state are two: investors perceive an improved climate for 
foreign direct investment, and it shields itself against other processes, 
such as diplomatic protection (Dolzer and Schreuer, 2008: 221). 
 
The role of international arbitration in international investment law 
deserves a closer look. Before getting to this point, it is prudent to 
examine the very nature of this institution, i.e. the essential features that 
make it what it is and differentiate it from other institutions. Not in vain 
it is international arbitration, with its special features, and not other 
institutions of governance, to which people caught in these disputes 
usually resort when seeking a mechanism of resolution. 
 
                                                 
3 For a description of the most common problems of public courts, see Caplan and 
Stringham (2008) and Nieto (2004). 
4 To name a few: Article 9(2)(b) of the China BIT Model of 2003; Article 8 of the 
French BIT Model; Article 11(b) of the German BIT Model of 2005; Article 8(2) of 
the UK BIT Model of 2005; and Article 24(1)(a)(i)(C) of the US BIT Model of 2004. 
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3. The Nature of International Arbitration 
 
Arbitration is a unique and fascinating institution. It is the closest thing 
that contemporary society has to a private means of adjudicating 
disputes in a time when states are expected to monopolize such means 
according to general public opinion. In spite of this, it is impossible to 
assert with total confidence that it only has such a distinction. For one 
thing, public institutions, at a national and international level, 
commonly regulate the use of arbitration. Besides, not every kind of 
dispute can be settled by arbitration, like criminal cases. At a local level, 
its functioning is conditioned by a state license of some sort, and at an 
international level many arbitration tribunals are inscribed in an 
institution regulated by an international convention, as is the case with 
the ICSID, which is part of the World Bank.  
 
Nevertheless, arbitration has certain characteristics of a private service. 
It is not free; in some cases, the parties involved make considerably 
large payments for it. Thus, its supply is allocated by prices paid by 
consumers, as opposed to a national court system, which is financed 
entirely by means of taxation. There is also competition, which is a sine 
qua non of the private supply of any private service imaginable. For 
instance, arbitrators compete among themselves for causes, being 
constantly evaluated in their performance award by award. Whether 
international or national, the institution of arbitration is inexorably 
bound to these features, which will be examined more deeply below. 
 
Competition is actually an essential feature of international arbitration; 
it is its very essence, which differentiates it from other institutions of 
law. The dispute resolution supply of international arbitration is 
polycentric; it contrasts with the monopolized supply of the national 
courts supported by the state. International arbitration not only 
witnesses competition among international arbitration institutions, but 
also presents an alternative, a very considerable one, to national courts 
of any number of states (Benson, 1999: 91-92). Thus, competition is 
found at the very nature of international arbitration. This point cannot be 
stressed enough. 
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As international arbitration competes against litigation in national 
courts, its use tends to spread significantly. Already at the beginning of 
the 1990s, almost 90 percent of all international trade contracts 
contained arbitration clauses (Berger, 1994: 12). Given this reliance, 
there are currently many sources of arbitration for disputes in matters of 
international business. For instance, many international traders rely on 
the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and its institution 
dedicated to arbitration (Benson, 1999: 93).5 There is also ad hoc 
arbitration, ―and in this regard, there is a rapidly growing market in 
private dispute resolution services provided by profit firms, at least in 
the United States‖ (Benson, 1999: 94). 
 
Concerning international investment arbitration, almost every foreign 
direct investment agreement contains an international arbitration clause, 
which is actually an incentive for foreign investors to take their business 
to the host state‘s territory. For example, there is the Energy Charter 
Treaty (ECT), which in Article 26(4) provides three possible arbitration 
fora for the settlement of a dispute concerning an investment: i) an 
ICSID Tribunal, if both the home state of the investor and the host state 
itself are parties to the ICSID Convention; ii) the Arbitration Rules of 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) before one arbitrator or an ad hoc arbitral tribunal; or iii) 
the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 
(Gouiffès, 2006: 25). Besides these, there are the following: i) the ICC; 
ii) the London Court of International Arbitration; and iii) the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration, to name a few. According to Dolzer and Schreuer 
(2008: 226), the procedures offered by these institutions have many 
elements in common,6 which include ―the competence of tribunals to 
decide on their own competence, the tribunal‘s power to determine the 
                                                 
5 Additionally, international trade usually relies on other know institutions, such as the 
American Arbitration Association (AAA), the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce, the 
Australian Centre for International Commercial Arbitration (ACICA), and the Israeli 
Institution of Commercial Arbitration. 
6 See also Böckstiegel (2006: 174): ―Regarding the procedure used in practice, of 
course, one relies primarily on the rules provided by the arbitral institutions. However, 
if we look more closely at these rules, we see many similarities and often identical 
solutions. This is the result of the modernization of almost all relevant arbitration rules 
in recent years, trying to take into account the experience and demands of arbitration 
practice.‖ 
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rules of procedure in the absence of a choice by the parties and the 
principle of confidentiality.‖ 
 
Therefore, the units of supply regarding international arbitration, in both 
commercial and investment law, are plentiful. Something that is worth 
mentioning about this fact is that the creation of this variety of 
arbitration fora is not to be considered groundless. There have been, and 
still are, important incentives for it. Not in vain the Preamble of the 
ICSID Convention uses the word favourable when referring to the 
creation of an investment climate especially characterized by this 
attribution. Given that both international trade and international 
investment law are considered highly sophisticated and intricate 
matters, it is obvious that the reason behind the creation of the above-
mentioned institutions is to offer an alternative that would match the 
expectations of the parties involved in a dispute embedded in one of 
those two international legal frames. An alternative to national courts, 
that is. 
 
In order to be considered a true alternative to national courts, keeping in 
mind the sophistication of international arbitration, institutions that deal 
with the resolution of international legal disputes are expected to offer 
certain special features in their procedures. For instance, international 
arbitration is attractive by the specialization of the arbitrators, which 
allows arbitration to be faster, less formal, and less expensive7 than 
litigation (Benson, 1999: 94). According to Benson (1999: 94), this is 
so, in part because ―the parties do not have to provide as much 
information to the arbitrator to avoid an error in judgment as they would 
to a non-specialized judge […].‖ Taking into account the opportunity 
costs of the parties involved in international arbitration, another benefit 
is to be seen when court time is allocated by waiting, since delay can 
become devastating to business. In this sense, international arbitration 
offered by the above-mentioned institutions is expected to function 
without such a delay. 
                                                 
7 As mentioned above, arbitration is not cheap. The reference to a lesser cost of 
arbitration is made taking into account not only the money paid to the arbitrators 
through their respective institutions, but also time, which, economically speaking, is a 
resource that is allocated. For more on time as a scarce resource, see Mises (2006: 
101-102). 
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course, one relies primarily on the rules provided by the arbitral institutions. However, 
if we look more closely at these rules, we see many similarities and often identical 
solutions. This is the result of the modernization of almost all relevant arbitration rules 
in recent years, trying to take into account the experience and demands of arbitration 
practice.‖ 
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rules of procedure in the absence of a choice by the parties and the 
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litigation (Benson, 1999: 94). According to Benson (1999: 94), this is 
so, in part because ―the parties do not have to provide as much 
information to the arbitrator to avoid an error in judgment as they would 
to a non-specialized judge […].‖ Taking into account the opportunity 
costs of the parties involved in international arbitration, another benefit 
is to be seen when court time is allocated by waiting, since delay can 
become devastating to business. In this sense, international arbitration 
offered by the above-mentioned institutions is expected to function 
without such a delay. 
                                                 
7 As mentioned above, arbitration is not cheap. The reference to a lesser cost of 
arbitration is made taking into account not only the money paid to the arbitrators 
through their respective institutions, but also time, which, economically speaking, is a 
resource that is allocated. For more on time as a scarce resource, see Mises (2006: 
101-102). 
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Confidentiality is an additional benefit of the international arbitration 
procedure. As Benson has said (1999: 94), privacy can be maintained if 
the parties agree to it. As for international investment arbitration, 
through the reform of 2006, Article 48(5) of the ICSID Convention 
allows the centre to publish its awards, given the proper consent of the 
parties to the arbitrational procedure. Thus, the parties keep the faculty 
of disclosure of the awards. 
 
Confidentiality has a high rank, as it is perceived by the parties as one 
of the many incentives of arbitration when compared to other forms of 
dispute settlement, like national courts (Knahr and Reinisch, 2006: 118; 
Buys, 2003: 122). According to Knahr and Reinisch (2006: 118), the 
main reason to regard confidentiality as such an important feature in this 
field is that is not uncommon to assume that a lot of firms appreciate 
privacy and confidentiality of arbitral proceedings ―because it protects 
business secrets and may help to protect the public image of companies 
when even mere fact of litigation released to the public might cause 
harm to its reputation.‖ An additional reason to consider it as an 
advantage is that in this way the tension between the parties to the 
dispute would be reduced. In the absence of the requirement to publicly 
comment on various steps of the procedure, it might be easier to come 
to an agreement on specific non-disputed aspects of a particular case, 
thus accelerating the proceedings (Knahr and Reinisch, 2006: 110). The 
confidential nature of the arbitrational procedure may facilitate 
settlement discussions between the parties and, ultimately, a ―mutually-
agreed-upon solution, be it in the form of an award on agreed terms or a 
direct settlement agreement between the parties‖ (Knahr and Reinisch, 
2006: 110). 
 
The same consideration can be made regarding investment arbitration, 
where the respondent is typically a state. Here, both the governmental 
and business secrets are to be safeguarded. Another advantage of 
confidentiality within the procedure is the contribution to the de-
politicization of the investment dispute, which is actually one of the 
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reasons behind the ICSID Centre (Sabater, 2010: 3).8 Additionally, 
taking into consideration the long-term relationship between host state 
and investor, confidentiality gives the possibility of facilitating any 
move towards a negotiated settlement between the parties involved 
(Knahr and Reinisch, 2006: 118). 
 
All of the above-mentioned advantages of international arbitration, 
which are derived from its competitive nature, are some of the very 
incentives that the parties seek in this particular dispute settlement 
mechanism. It applies to international commercial and investment 
arbitration. These features, confidentiality among them, make 
international arbitration efficient, in terms of satisfying the complex 
needs of dispute adjudication of the parties involved in a case related to 
international investment or commercial law. 
 
4. The Concept of Transparency 
 
The principle of transparency in international investment arbitration 
procedures has long been considered of crucial importance, along with 
the principle of confidentiality (Delaney and Barstow Magraw, 2008: 
751). This justifies dedicating to this principle a considerably large part 
of whatever academic research on this topic is being made. However, 
there are additional reasons for that. On the one hand, the scope of the 
term ―transparency‖ should become clear, as well as what it refers to. 
On the other hand, grasping this concept should also add clarity to the 
way in which it must be applied depending on the context. Furthermore, 
the possible implications of the execution of a general policy of 
transparency in international investment arbitration procedure could be 
better understood. As will be seen, the perspective from which the 
principle of transparency is applied in the field of international 
economic law, investment law, and investment arbitration procedural 
rules is very different and demands a closer look in each context. 
 
                                                 
8 Sabater (2010: 3) makes this comment when discussing the transparency movement 
currently trying to influence investment arbitration: ―Ironically, one of the reasons that 
ICSID was created was to remove the resolution of investment disputes of the political 
arena.‖ 
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4.1. General Concept of Transparency in International Economic 
Law 
 
In its most obvious meaning in the context of law, transparency refers 
to the condition of a regulation, law, or legal procedure to be 
transparent, i.e. to the possibility of easily seeing through it (Zöllner, 
2006: 584). Thus, as Zöllner comments (2006: 584), ―the process and 
effects of the legal instrument in question must be readily 
understandable, and the scope of its derivative rights and obligations 
must be easy to assess for the addressee and rights-holder respectively.‖ 
On an international level, the term transparency refers to the 
accessibility and clarity of obligations contained in a specific 
international treaty, but also to the actions of the parties involved in 
such an international legal relation (Zöllner, 2006: 585). Thus, the 
relevant parties to a treaty must know the content and respective 
implications of the international legal duties that they are bound to, and 
the actions of those relevant parties. In this sense, the concept of 
transparency is considered a principle at an international level, which 
demands from the parties both openness and the disclosure to the other 
interested parties of critical information that could affect their legal and 
economic position. 
 
Considering that international economic law is understood as the legal 
order that is aimed at the regulation of the economic relations between 
states, international organizations and private enterprises (Herdegen, 
2008: 1; Tietje, 2009: 13; Lowenfeld, 2008: 3-4), it can be stated that 
the principle of transparency within this particular field of law regulates 
the accessibility of information and knowledge of the decisions of 
economic subjects that have engaged in an international economic 
relation within an international legal frame. Logically, this principle has 
two major implications. On the one hand, it deals with the control that 
parties in the international economic field exercise over their activities 
in accordance with international obligations—contained in international 
legal instruments, such as treaties; on the other hand, it deals with the 
parties taking action ―with full, accurate, reliable and complete 
information and knowledge of the relevant framework‖ (Zöllner, 2006: 
585). In this sense, the principle of transparency contains a feature of 
predictability, and as such, for instance, states are expected to make 
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policy and regulatory information available to foreign investors, so that 
investors can be relatively certain of the way in which the host state is 
going to handle their investment. 
 
At this point, it can be seen how the concept of transparency reaches the 
category of principle. As such, its content is aimed principally, but not 
exclusively, at states vis-à-vis other economic actors, for it is the states, 
by means of treaties, that set the legal frame that regulates the economic 
relation with international organizations and international private 
enterprises. Thus, the state is supposed to make available the means by 
which it sets economic policy, which is traditionally the law in its 
formal sense, as well as administrative and judicial decisions with a 
broad range of applications. Hence, the transparency principle purports 
to secure a safe level playing field between economic actors at an 
international level (Zöllner, 2006: 589).9  
 
The obligation to publish legal instruments that contain the policies 
associated with economic relationships is an unmistakable expression of 
the transparency principle in international economic law.10 This 
provides control to economic actors to comply with said policies; it also 
allows them to assess the collateral economic impact that comes along 
with the measure (Zöllner, 2006: 590). 
 
4.2. Transparency in Investment Law 
 
As has been shown, transparency is an important principle within 
international relations in the context of international economic law. 
Logically, this principle is also important in the context of international 
investment law, particularly as an element of the standard of fair and 
equitable treatment (Yannaca-Small, 2008: 121-122). For example, 
expressions of this principle can be found in NAFTA. According to its 
preamble, the state parties are obligated to ―establish clear and mutually 
                                                 
9 Obviously, the principle of transparency is also to be applied to other subjects of 
international law, such as international companies. 
10 In the context of the WTO, the provisions concerning transparency in GATT prevent 
a lack of transparency, which could ―deter the influx of foreign products, thus making 
it functionally equivalent to a tariff.‖ One of the most significant GATT provision is 
the one found in Article X. 
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advantageous rules governing their trade and ensure a predictable 
commercial framework for business planning and investment.‖11 
According to Zöllner (2006: 596), this particular treaty contains many 
more procedural obligations, which aim to allow governments of other 
parties and investors to get sufficient understanding of the relevant 
domestic rule-making process and possibly to provide input. ―Thus, 
even though the specific content of laws remains largely at the 
discretion of the parties, the formation and application of those laws and 
regulations must be transparent‖ (Zöllner, 2006: 596). 
 
The Additional Facility of ICSID decided one of the most influential 
cases related to this principle: the Metalclad case. In this case, the 
tribunal clarified that transparency is relevant when applying the 
protection standard of fair and equitable treatment. In the words of the 
tribunal:  
 
[P]rominent in the statement of principles and rules that 
introduces the Agreement is the reference to ―transparency‖ 
(NAFTA Article 102 (1)). The Tribunal understands this to 
include the idea that all relevant legal requirements for the 
purpose of initiating, completing and successfully operating 
investments made, or intended to be made, under the 
Agreement should be capable of being readily known to all 
affected investors of another Party (Metalclad Corporation vs. 
United Mexican States, 2000: par. 75-76). 
 
In this sense, the tribunal attributed to the transparency principle a 
highly important role, one that allows deeper interpretations of the 
extent of the standard of fair and equitable treatment. If the state does 
not ensure a transparent regulatory frame, it commits a serious breach of 
the original investment agreement to which the parties are bound. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Additionally, Article 1802 of NAFTA contains the duty to ensure prompt and 
advance publication of laws, regulations, procedures, and administrative rulings of a 
general nature. 
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4.3. Application of the Transparency Principle 
 
Transparency in international economic law is a principle that aims to 
force the subjects of international economic law to be transparent. 
Particularly, it is a principle designed to obligate a state that is party to a 
specific international treaty to disclose sufficient information about its 
regulatory frame as it possibly can, which would eventually affect 
—positively or negatively—another international economic subject, 
such as investors or importers and exporters of another contracting state. 
Transparency is one of the elements that are supposed to hold the state 
legally accountable in its international relations. It is also the very 
feature that allows investors to trust the state through which they will 
establish business. If the state does not act in a transparent manner, no 
investor would take their investment within its territory, for no investor 
would jeopardize his or her resources in a context where they would be 
any less than safe. Transparency is, as a principle, directed to rule the 
conduct of subjects of international economic law in order to maintain 
an environment suitable for economic relations. 
 
4.4. Transparency in Investment Arbitration: Beyond Due Process 
 
When dealing with investment arbitration, the discussion of the 
application of the principle of transparency is made from another 
perspective. Originally, the discussion takes place in the context of the 
legal category of due process. Thus, an arbitration procedure is 
considered nontransparent if it overlooks the procedural rights of a 
party, be it a claimant or a defendant (Philip, 2008: 70). This is the 
initial understanding of transparency in this context. 
 
However, according to Sabater (2010: 1), the current debate on 
transparency in arbitrational procedure ―greatly exceeds the confines of 
due process and enters the realm of politics.‖ Is this sense, there is a 
lack of transparency in investment arbitration—and, consequently, it 
would be considered an illegitimate means of dispute resolution—
because, in particular cases, ―the written arguments from the parties and 
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due process and enters the realm of politics.‖ Is this sense, there is a 
lack of transparency in investment arbitration—and, consequently, it 
would be considered an illegitimate means of dispute resolution—
because, in particular cases, ―the written arguments from the parties and 
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the hearings had been kept confidential from the public in general‖ 
(Sabater, 2010: 1).12 
 
If the application of the transparency principle—as explained above—is 
taken into account, it must be noticed that the application of this 
principle to investment arbitral tribunals and their actions is very 
different. The application explained above is directed primarily to states 
as subjects of international economic law and not to investment arbitral 
tribunals, and both are different in nature. States, unlike arbitral 
tribunals, make policy decisions. International arbitral tribunals may 
review such policies, but they surely do not make them. Their single and 
strictly limited function is to adjudicate disputes by means of 
interpreting whatever legal source the parties have previously agreed 
upon. They belong to two completely separate spheres. A state is, 
according to constitutional law, accountable to its nationals, and, 
following this logic, it is expected to be transparent, not only to said 
nationals but also to those other subjects of international economic law 
that are engaged in economic relationship with it. In essence, an 
investment arbitral tribunal does not have constituents in the same way 
that a state does; instead, it is an entity empowered by the parties to a 
dispute to give it lawful resolution according to certain rules (Sabater, 
2010: 2). In fact, as mentioned above, it is part of the very nature of 
international arbitration—investment arbitration included—to remain 
confidential in its contents if the parties so decide. It is only with 
caution that the transparency principle can be applied to investment 
arbitration. 
 
However, there is a very special consideration to be made in the case of 
investment arbitration. According to Sabater (2010: 2), ―saying that the 
term ‗transparency‘ is alien to, and cannot be freely applied in, 
investment arbitration, does not equate to suggesting that arbitration 
should always take place behind closed doors.‖ It is true, like it has been 
said above, that international investment arbitration is a special kind of 
arbitration, for one of the parties is a state. The state, as party to the 
arbitral procedure, is expected to disclose to its ―citizens the existence, 
                                                 
12 This is especially referred to the ICSID tribunal‘s Biwater Gauff vs. Tanzania case, 
Award, 24 July 2008. 
Analysis of the Principle of Transparency… 
121 
essential contents, and outcome of the investment arbitrations in which 
[it is] involved‖ (Delaney and Barstow Magraw, 2008: 721). In this 
context, a nuanced application of the transparency principle is required. 
 
A particular problem arises when the adoption of provisions that attempt 
to make investment arbitration more ―transparent‖ allow for the 
intervention in the proceedings of third parties with a significant interest 
in its outcome, without any further special consideration to the nature of 
the institution to which these provisions plan to be applied. This is the 
case of the proposal of the European Commission in the context of the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which is contained, partially, in 
the draft Regulation Establishing Transitional Arrangements for 
Bilateral Investment Agreements between Member States and Third 
Countries (the Draft). According to Article 13(2) of the Draft, in all 
cases where an arbitration procedure is initiated against a member state 
of the EU—given a breach of the applicable BIT—the Commission 
must be informed about it. Thus, the Commission and the involved 
member state will have to undertake measures in order to defend the 
latter, a participation of the Commission as party to the procedure not 
being excluded (Tietje, 2010: 12). According to Sabater (2010: 3), 
proposals such as this one ―are fraught with difficulties and 
inconsistencies that threaten the survival of investment arbitration as a 
worthy and efficient dispute resolution mechanism.‖ A similar 
consequence would follow the application of a general policy of 
transparency, which would make it compulsory for the tribunal to fully 
disclose the content and final outcome of the procedure, overlooking the 
possible original agreement of the parties to the contrary. Such a 
measure would evidently ignore one of the features that are of the nature 
of investment arbitration (confidentiality), and thus one of the reasons 
why the parties agreed to arbitration in the first place. 
 
Even though international investment arbitration calls for special 
considerations, taking into account the nature of the dispute it deals 
with, the case for a general policy of transparency applied to arbitral 
tribunals needs to be examined with greater rigor. The reason for this is 
that such an approach, as it is initially considered13 (full disclosure of 
                                                 
13 With no further consideration of the nature of international arbitration. 
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12 This is especially referred to the ICSID tribunal‘s Biwater Gauff vs. Tanzania case, 
Award, 24 July 2008. 
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13 With no further consideration of the nature of international arbitration. 
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what happens in the procedure and the participation of ―third parties‖ 
with significant interest), could prevent the parties to the dispute to 
obtain what they sought in arbitration in the first place, i.e. an efficient 
legal solution (means) to a legal dispute (end). This could result in 
additional costs and delays and, what is worse, not lead to a fairer or 
more accurate solution to the dispute (Sabater, 2010: 4).14 
 
It is now time to enter more deeply into the question of the compromise 
between the principles of transparency and confidentiality, which 
inevitably conflict in every dispute taken to an arbitral tribunal deciding 
cases in the context of international investment law. 
 
5. Transparency versus Confidentiality in International Investment 
Arbitration 
 
Even though the current trend towards transparency in international 
investment arbitration is a fact (Teitelbaum, 2010: 54-55), as evidenced 
in the 2006 reform of Article 48(5) of the ICSID Convention15 and Rule 
37(2) of the Arbitral Rules of ICSID,16 and in the existence of the 
institution of amicus curiae, confidentiality is still taken into serious 
consideration in the context of international investment arbitration 
procedure. As previously said, there is currently a tension between 
transparency and confidentiality in international investment arbitration. 
When studied more closely, the entire discussion takes place in the 
compromise between the principle of transparency in the context of 
                                                 
14 In order to gain sufficient understanding of the current state of affairs regarding 
confidentiality in the context of international investment arbitration, the following 
legal sources should be taken into account: Article 48(5) of the ICSID Convention, 
regarding publication of awards by the centre; Rule 6(2) of the ICSID Arbitration 
Rules, regarding obligations of secrecy of the arbitrators; Regulation 22(2) of the 
Administrative and Financial Regulations of ICSID, on publication of awards and 
minutes and other records of proceedings; Rule 48(4)of the reformed Arbitration Rules 
of 2006, regarding publication of excerpts of the legal reasoning of awards; and 
Article 37(2) of the Arbitration Rules of ICSID, concerning the submission of amicus 
curiae briefs. 
15 According to Article 48(5) of the ICSID Convention, ―the Centre shall not publish 
the award without the consent of the parties.‖ 
16 After consulting both parties, the tribunal may allow a non-disputing party to file a 
written submission with the tribunal regarding a matter within the scope of the dispute. 
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international economic law—and not from the strict perspective of due 
process—and the inherent procedural feature of confidentiality in 
international arbitration. The reason for this is that, unarguably, the 
concept of transparency does go, in fact, beyond the realm of due 
process in this particular context (Sabater, 2010), because the presence 
of the state as a party is an evident fact. This is actually a necessary 
discussion that needs to take place. For one thing, international 
investment arbitration is still international arbitration. Because of its 
nature and its inherent features, foreign investors and host states as 
subjects of international economic law recur to it. It is a well-known 
means to a very simple end: the settlement of investment disputes. The 
fact that there is a certain level of confidentiality contributes to this fact. 
However, it also takes place in the field of international investment law, 
and in this sense, foreign investors relate legally to states, and when the 
legal frame of said relation breaks for some reason, both interests have 
to be weighted in order to settle the dispute. This is the significantly 
strong reason to conclude that international investment arbitration is, in 
fact, a special kind of arbitration: in this context, the question of how to 
balance the demand for transparency against the need for confidentiality 
arises.17 
 
One of the most commented cases regarding this particular subject is the 
Biwater Gauff case,18 decided by an ICSID tribunal. In this case, the 
tribunal stated that there is no provision, whether in the ICSID 
Convention or in any of the applicable rules, that imposes a general duty 
of confidentiality in an ICSID arbitration procedure. However, there is 
equally no provision imposing a general duty of transparency (Bitwater 
Gauff Ltd. vs. United Republic of Tanzania, 2006: par. 121). In this 
sense, it is within the discretion of each individual tribunal to find the 
proper compromise when conducting proceedings. The demands for 
                                                 
17 According to Knahr and Reinisch (2006: 98), ―it is not easy to determine to what 
extent the arbitral process should be transparent and where confidentiality, which is 
generally considered to be one of the basic characteristics of arbitration, should 
prevail.‖ 
18 In this case, the claimant filed a request calling upon provisional measures on 
confidentiality, complaining about unilateral disclosure of the Minutes of a first 
meeting of the tribunal and the Procedural Order No. 2 on the Internet. 
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transparency have to respect the procedural integrity and the interest of 
the parties over the confidentiality of certain information of the process. 
 
In this particular case, the tribunal noted that the parties are free to 
conclude confidentiality agreements. Additionally, taking into account 
the possible disruption that an arbitral process could suffer due to the 
disclosure and publication by the parties of certain kinds of documents, 
the tribunal concluded that ―the disclosure of decisions, orders and 
directions […] should be considered on a case-by-case basis‖ (par. 152-
154; emphasis added) and only under prior permission of the tribunal. It 
also concluded that the publication of minutes of hearings (par. 155), 
pleadings or written memorials (par. 158-160), and documents produced 
by the opposing party (par. 157) may threaten the integrity of the 
procedure and should not, in principle, be allowed by the tribunal. 
Notwithstanding, the tribunal considered appropriated giving the parties 
the opportunity to ask the tribunal for exceptions to this restriction on, 
again, a case-by-case basis (par. 162). 
 
It is worth noticing in this case that the tribunal recognized that the 
aspects of every one of the cases in an arbitral tribunal are very specific. 
Not in vain did the tribunal stress the argument for a case-by-case 
approach when making decisions on limitations of confidentiality. Thus, 
the merits of each case need to be sufficiently convincing in order to 
expect the disclosure and publication of its content, and the possible 
admission of non-disputing parties. This means that whatever is argued 
for the publication and disclosure and the admission of amicus curiae 
briefs—by means of which international arbitration is expected to be 
transparent—it has to carry sufficient authority and credibility in order 
to justify an erosion of the confidentiality of the procedure. 
 
One important contribution made by the Biwater Gauff case is the 
fundamental idea that each case must be properly balanced. The case 
thus affirms that a general policy toward either one of the extremes, be 
it full transparency or full confidentiality, is not advisable. To take one 
example, consider the policy proposed by the European Commission 
(the Commission) in the context of the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty. From this moment on, the EU will be negotiating and eventually 
ratifying investment treaties, instead of the individually considered 
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member states of the union. One of the policies proposed by the EU that 
goes in this direction is the one contained in Article 13(2) of the Draft, 
where the participation of non-disputing parties is taken to the extreme. 
According to this document, in all cases where an investor requests an 
arbitration proceeding against its host state, the Commission must be 
informed about this fact. In this way, the Commission and the host state 
against which the claim is being filed would undertake a joint defense of 
the latter. Additionally, the possibility that the Commission would 
participate as a party of interest in the procedure is not excluded (Tietje, 
2010: 12). 
 
Another proposal made by the Commission (2010) is to be found in the 
Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions: Towards a Comprehensive European 
International Investment Policy (the Communication). As it can be 
deduced from its title, the main objective of this document is to explore 
―how the Union may develop an international investment policy‖ 
(European Commission, 2010: 2). In this document, the Commission 
clearly states that one of the main challenges of the investor-state 
dispute settlement mechanism is the transparency of the procedure. In 
this sense, the Commission states that the procedure ―should be 
conducted in a transparent manner (including requests for arbitration, 
submissions, open hearings, amicus curiae briefs and publication of 
awards)‖ (European Commission, 2010: 10). 
 
There are considerably good reasons to take a closer look of these 
policies. No mention is made of the special condition of international 
investment arbitration, understood as a condition where the tribunal 
needs to consider the particular circumstances of each case in order to 
balance both the need of confidentiality and the demands for 
transparency. As these policies are initially constructed, their 
compliance could threaten the efficiency of the arbitral process, for it 
would add a certain level of difficulty and inconsistency to investment 
arbitration (Sabater, 2010: 3). In fact, as Sabater (2010: 3) points out, by 
allowing the intervention of third parties, investment arbitration runs the 
risk of resembling the procedure of national courts, with its delays, 
complexities, and publicity, which is exactly what the parties tried to 
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avoid when they opted for arbitration as the proper dispute settlement 
mechanism. Additionally, this could contribute to the politicization of 
the arbitral procedure, which the parties were also, and more 
emphatically, trying to avoid. 
 
The institutions backing transparency in investment arbitration are 
known—and in some cases, demanded—for particular reasons. One of 
them is, as it is usually asserted by legal scholars, that through them 
higher quality decision-making is achieved. According to this argument, 
given the proper level of transparency, more accurate, thorough, and 
defensible decisions by arbitrators are assured, and, at least to some 
degree, ―improper behavior (such as corruption in the arbitral process, 
and possibly with respect to activities leading to arbitration)‖ is avoided 
(Delaney and Barstow Magraw, 2008: 761). Another commonly 
mentioned reason is that, in this way, democratic values are served, 
informing those who are eventually affected by government activities. 
Additionally, it is commonly argued that, by having more transparency, 
consistency is achieved by ―interpreting and applying arbitral rules, 
because tribunals can be aware of other tribunal‘s work‖ (Delaney and 
Barstow Magraw, 2008: 762). Other reasons are the accountability of 
the institution of investment arbitration, the legitimacy of this 
institution, and the possibility of systematically reforming investment 
arbitration (Delaney and Barstow Magraw, 2008: 762). 
 
If examined more closely, the main reasons that underlie the demands 
for transparency (higher-quality decision making, democratic values, 
consistency, accountability, legitimacy, and systematic reforms) can be 
summarized in three major arguments: evolution of investment law, 
confidence in the system of international investment law, and public 
interest. 
 
According to the argument of evolution of investment law,19 the 
provisions of most BITs and MITs such as the ECT are worded in a 
                                                 
19 According to Knahr and Reinisch (2006: 97), ―The public availability of judicial or 
quasi-judicial decision is particularly important where the substantive rules governing 
disputes between parties are of a highly general and vague character. This is a 
phenomenon not unknown in international law where sometimes very abstract rules 
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rather imprecise and indeterminate character; it is only through their 
interpretation and application ―in the context of investment arbitration 
that [say] fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security, 
expropriation and other notions become workable concepts‖ (Knahr and 
Reinisch, 2006: 112). While this is entirely true, it overlooks the fact 
that, in the case of the ICSID Centre, the reformed rule 48(4) of its 
Arbitration Rules indicates that it shall promptly include in its 
publications excerpts of the legal reasoning of the Tribunal. Being 
aware of the importance of the role of investment arbitration decisions 
in the evolution of international law, an institution is already 
contributing to this cause, but it does so without ignoring one of the 
characteristics that are ranked most highly among the potential users of 
this particular dispute settlement mechanism.20, 21 
 
Another argument for publicity in investment arbitration is that it allows 
confidence in the system of investment arbitration to be created or 
reestablished (Knahr and Reinisch, 2006: 112). In this way, according to 
Knahr and Reinisch (2006: 112), the arbitrators, who are ―unelected‖ 
and ―unaccountable,‖ will have to be professional and highly skilled 
experts, given that their rulings would be open to the public. These 
authors overlook the fact that the arbitrators to a particular investment 
law case have been selected by the parties to the dispute, and are 
actually accountable to them. This argument also overlooks the 
importance of the competitive nature of international arbitration, from 
which investment arbitration is not excluded. As has been previously 
                                                                                                                     
are agreed upon in treaties, often in the form of vague compromise formulations, 
which are in need of interpretation by dispute settlement institutions.‖ 
20 This is not a situation exclusive to international investment law. Bernstein (1992: 
150) comments on a similar situation in the legal relations within the community of 
diamond dealers around the world. For instance, diamond dealers have recognized that 
their secrecy practices in their arbitration processes were creating uncertainty among 
the members of their community. In this sense, many trading clubs changed their 
institutions, and because of this, arbitrators now publish written announcements of the 
principles applied in novel cases while keeping the parties and identifying facts secret. 
21 There is a very interesting point to be made on this particular issue. Bernstein (1992: 
121), writing about the diamond trading clubs, comments that there is a considerable 
―unofficial flow‖ of information through word of mouth—most commonly referred to 
as gossip—within this trade community. Chances are that this could also happen in the 
daily practice of international investment arbitration. This, however, merits a deeper 
examination. 
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stressed, an investment arbitration tribunal is the parties‘ tribunal. In any 
arbitration tribunal, the arbitrators have been chosen precisely because 
they are highly skilled and professional in their rulings. The fact that 
international arbitration is, by its very nature, competitive cannot be 
stressed enough. As arbitrators compete with each other, and arbitration 
tribunals compete with the national and purely public means of 
adjudicating justice, they are constantly being held in check by different 
interests groups, such as the current parties, future parties, and scholars, 
award by award. It is precisely because arbitrators have to build their 
reputation of being ―good‖ and ―highly skilled‖ in every case that they 
have a strong and credible incentive to produce clear and unbiased 
decisions. 
 
Finally, there is the major argument of public interest, which is directly 
related to the special condition of international investment arbitration 
that has been profusely mentioned in this article. This public interest 
stems from the fact that one of the parties to the dispute is actually a 
state, which is supposedly legally bound to provide public services to its 
constituents. Thus, in virtually all cases investment arbitration concerns 
matters that are considered public services, which, according to the 
public good theory, are supposed to be produced and financed by the 
state (Knahr and Reinisch, 2006: 113). In this sense, cases often deal 
with environmental or health policies, as well as expropriation, and 
logically the state may be bound to make important parts of the 
proceedings available to the public, including the final decision. 
 
In the context of making a decision on the submission of amicus curiae 
briefs, the Suez-Vivendi case acknowledged the fact that in these 
particular circumstances, whenever a state is a party to the dispute, the 
following must not be overlooked: 
 
[T]he Tribunal finds that the present case potentially involves 
matters of public interest. This case will consider the legality 
under international law, not domestic private law, of various 
actions and measures taken by governments. The international 
responsibility of a state, the Argentine Republic, is also at 
stake, as opposed to the liability of a corporation arising out of 
private law. While these factors are certainly matters of public 
interest, they are present in virtually all cases of investment 
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treaty arbitration under ICSID jurisdiction. The factor that 
gives this case particular public interest is that the investment 
dispute centers around the water distribution and sewage 
systems of a large metropolitan area, the city of Buenos Aires 
and surrounding municipalities. Those systems provide basic 
public services to millions of people and as a result may raise 
a variety of complex public and international questions, 
including human rights considerations. Any decision rendered 
in this case, whether in favor of the Claimant or Respondent, 
has the potential to affect the operation of those systems and 
thereby the public they serve. (Aguas Argentinas S. A., Suez 
Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S. A., and Vivendi 
Universal S. A. vs. Argentine Republic, 2006: par 19) 
 
This argument is quite important, for the situation related to the 
involvement of the state, and the consequences of this fact in the 
procedure are unavoidable when it comes to international investment 
arbitration. Unarguably, when a tribunal deals with a case concerning 
public health, the provision of water and sewage services, national 
security, and state responsibility, it supposes an outcome that would be 
the object of thorough public scrutiny. Therefore, such considerations 
must be taken into account when deciding upon confidentiality. 
 
Following this reasoning, the conclusion appears to be that the specific 
circumstances of each particular case have to be considered when 
dealing with transparency in international investment arbitration. As a 
result, and by taking into account the importance of the role of the state, 
an apparently considerable reason is given to erode the principle of 
confidentiality in the investment arbitral process, a feature that was 
initially highly ranked. In principle, the reasons to conclude otherwise 
are rather limited. For one, the considerations in favor of the 
development and confidence of the system of international investment 
law do not seem convincing when examined more thoroughly; there are 
more plausible ways to achieve these goals without overlooking the 
inherent feature of confidentiality, and therefore without impairing its 
correct functioning. It seems that it is actually the very special condition 
of international investment arbitration that provides the answer of when 
publicity is expected to be enforced in these kinds of procedures. 
Accordingly, it is the task of the arbitral tribunal itself to decide upon 
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the merits to do so, on a case-by-case basis, always taking into 
consideration the significant part played by the presence of the state as a 
party. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
After the above reasoning, the following conclusions are to be made: 
 
6.1. Among all the available institutions satisfying the need for justice 
adjudication in the context of investment disputes, international 
arbitration is the mechanism to which most parties resort. The reasons 
for this are twofold. On the one hand, the limitations of the other 
institutions do not assure an unbiased decision and could exacerbate the 
differences of the parties to the dispute. On the other hand, due to the 
inherent features of international arbitration—to its nature—
international arbitration offers an up-to-the-task means of justice 
adjudication within the system of international investment law. 
6.2. By observing international arbitration and comparing it with 
national court systems, it can be concluded that the former is 
competitive in nature. This is understood as the condition of 
international arbitration of being polycentric, as opposed to the 
monopolized supply of national courts by states. Thus, international 
arbitration tribunals do not only compete with each other, but also offer 
an alternative to national courts. 
6.3. In this sense, international arbitration competes by offering special 
features in its procedure. In addition to being less expensive, less 
formal, and faster than litigation, it offers the possibility to keep its 
procedure confidential if the parties so agree. Thus, it is in the nature of 
international arbitration to remain confidential if the parties have 
previously decided so. 
6.4. Within the specific system of international investment law, 
confidentiality in the arbitral procedure is expected by the parties, 
which, in this case, are commonly a state and a foreign investor. Thus, 
both government and business secrets are protected. Furthermore, 
considering the long-term relationship between the host state and the 
investor, confidentiality facilitates a negotiated settlement between both 
parties. 
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6.5. Transparency has important implications in international 
investment arbitration, which is why it deserves a close examination. 
Thus, in the context of international economic law, transparency is a 
principle that governs the actions of international economic subjects, 
allowing them to comply with their international obligations and to 
assess the collateral economic impact of their counterparts‘ actions. 
Within the context of international investment law, the principle of 
transparency is a defining element of the standard of fair and equitable 
treatment. 
6.6. Concerning the investment arbitration procedure, the application of 
the principle of transparency calls for a nuanced approach. Such a 
principle is initially directed to subjects of international economic law, 
but arbitration tribunals are institutions of a different nature. Keeping in 
mind the inherent features of international arbitration and the role that 
this institution plays in the development of the system of investment 
law, any policy directed at making it more transparent should take into 
consideration the nature of international arbitration, in order to avoid 
depriving this mechanism of its efficiency. 
6.7. Nevertheless, the fact that one of the parties in investment 
arbitration is the state gives sufficient reason for demanding 
transparency in the procedure, because matters of public interest are 
often examined. Given that international investment arbitration is 
essentially confidential, and taking into consideration the unavoidable 
fact that public interests are often at stake, the need for a defendable 
argument that allows overlooking confidentiality in favor of 
transparency arises. 
6.8. After reviewing the commonly stressed arguments for transparency, 
it can be concluded that the only defendable one is precisely the public 
interest at stake in the procedure. Solely on the basis of the public 
interest that may be at issue in a particular investment arbitral procedure 
can the demands for transparency be satisfied, by means of submission 
of amicus curiae briefs by non-disputing parties and by the publication 
of procedural documents when the parties have not agreed to the 
contrary. 
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